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This essay is adapted
from "Don't Try:
Civil Jury Verdicts
in a System Geared to
Settlement," appearing
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If it is true, as we often hear, that we are one of the most Iiigbus

'i

societies on earth, it is because of our propensky to sue.

not our affinity tor trials. Of the hundreds of thousands of civil
h~wsuitsthat are Med each year in Ameriea, the great majority
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\ dismissed by the plaintiffs or by the courts; only a few percent

I
--

*
74

are tried to a jury or a judge.
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This is no accident.
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designed a system of civil justice that
embodies and expresses that preference
in everythmg from the rules of procedure
and evidence, to appellate opinions, to
legal scholarship, to the daily work of our
trial judges. Our culture portrays trial especially trial by jury - as the
quintessential dramatic instrument of
justice. Our judicial system operates on a
different premise: that trial is a disease not generally fatal, but serious enough to
be avoided at any reasonable cost.
Preference for settlement is not unique
to the American legal system but it is
especially pervasive and strong, for
several reasons. We have many lawyers,
by any count, but few judges. As a result,
we have very many litigated disputes per
judge - so it is essential that most cases
be resolved without judgment. This
scarcity of judges is possible because of
our adversary system of adjudication. In
this system the parties control the
development and presentation of facts;
the fact finder (judge or jury) is passive,
and has a comparatively small role in the
process. Party control of evidence makes
private settlement easier, since the parties
themselves, rather than the court, procure
the information they need to negotiate.
Adversary fact finding is also expensive,
unpredictable (especially if the ultimate
tribunal is a jury), and, given our scarcity
of judges,
As a result, the savings to
- -slow.
be reahzed by settlement - in time,
money and Ask - are greater than they
might be in a quicker, cheaper and more
predictable system. These explanations, of
course, are not independent of each
other. On the contrary, the major
structural reasons for the special
importance of settlement in American
litigation -scarcity of judges and
abundance of lawyers, adversarial fact
finding, trial by jury - are all
manifestations of a single cultural value:
the preference for private ordering over
public control.
Trials, of course, are important beyond
their numbers. For the public, trials have
the advantage of visibility They are open
and dramatic whle settlements are
usually boring and private - in fact,
invisible. Their openness also makes trials
attractive subjects for study by scholars,
with the added benefit that cases that are
fought to the end are likely to present
more of the issues that we like-to study
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When dvil disputes end in trial
and need to teach. But for practitioners
trials are important primarily because
they influence the terms of settlement for
the mass of cases that are not tried because they cast a major part of the legal
shadow within which private bargaining
takes place. Tiials have this standard-setting
effect despite the fact that they are not
typical of the cases in whlch their results
are used as guides for settlement.
Scholars are unanimous in r e c o p i n g
that trials are not representative of the
mass of litigated disputes. They seem to
be selected because of unusual rather
than common features, such as high
stakes, extreme uncertainty about the
outcome, and reputational stakes of the
parties. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants
(1994) is an extreme case, but a useful
example nonetheless.
On Feb, 27, 1992, Mrs. Stella Liebeck,
aged 79, a passenger in a car driven by
her grandson, bought a cup of coffee at a
take-out window of a McDonald's in
Albuquerque. With the car stopped, she
held the styrofoam cup between her legs,
tried to pry off the top, and spilled the
coffee -whch was scaldmg hot. She
suffered third degree bums. She sued,
and three years later a jury returned a
verdict against the McDonald's Corporation
for $160,000 in compensatory damages
and $2.7 million in punitive damages.
The verdct became an instant cliche in
the tort reform debate. At first, it was the
ultimate jury-trial horror story: Woman
gets $2.86 Mihon For Spilling Her
Coffee. Later, it re-emerged as a tale of
justice done: Mrs. Liebeck was severely
injured - she was hospitalized for eight
days and required s h grafts; she was
injured because of McDonaldb policy of
serving coffee 15 to 20 degrees hotter
than its competitors; McDonald's knew
the danger of sellmg coffee at that heat it had received 700 prior complaints in
the previous five years, some involving
serious bums -but it never considered
changmg its practice; the $2.7 million

there is almost always a clear loser, and usually a clear winner as well.
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Tp rl-d
m1tx& inAmerica it
is n e d r y to m&&r them in the
context d the p r e d bargaining in
whi& d d &ti@ipn
is usually molved
That is w k w g attempt &-&is utide,
u s Q ' k v ~ s a m ~ofk sd d jury trbh in
Gallfor@%z4ate mmt5, one horn 19851986,zpd one b m 1990-1991.Both
stamp&, were draws from case reports
in Jwy&I,
Mekly, a state-wide
Calif~r&jury verdict repmter that is
widely used by lnwyen in eduatmg their
cases -in o k wonk, our data were
generated by one of the iwtnxments
t&&
which tlinls cast their shadows
over ietrkmmt negotiations. For the
second sample, we aLvJ interviewed 735
attorneys who represented a plaintiff or
defendant ia one of the cases,and asked
them ahout insurance coverageafee
armqpmen~v
the parties' pre-trial
bargpining positions, and the k a o that
~
drmtheheepsesto.ThiSnwey
provides unique data. ,
For this nrtide, we ammMed a
statistid p o w 01the civil jury-trial
caselard of the California State Superior
Courts, the stare murts bf .~eaeral
ju-don.
Bljefl~we find that most
civil jury rrinls in C&f.omh (over 70%)
concern pemw1 injury clPims of one
sort ar another; that h o s t dl plaintiff&
in triaJ~of wry sort, slre individuals;that
the awhej+o*
of thes
plainti& (epwidy in personal injury
cases) pay their attorneys on P contingent
basis; md that almost all defendants,

Thetypicdddjury~liapasad
injury claim by an indiyiduEllsgainn a
large a m p w , in which wither party is
playing with its own money: the plaintiff
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Veryfavcvesgotouial,mdthQsethat
do are atyplcdy &ficult disputes chat
could not be rompromised by the parties
and are nor W y so produce cornprombe
verdicts. Once a@, Liebeck u Md)offalds
is a good ill-tion.
The defendant
~ e c h v . ~ ~ & d ~ c z i t e r passed
i a , up many opportunities to set&.
stvting with a $2,000 d e d by the
except that the &fen*
any well have
p W before she filed the complaint,
been dinsured.
with a $225,000
Thrse mxable o u w m emerge frmn and en@
~ummendra~on
h m a mediatar. At
the outcom of these t d s :
trial, the issue was k
d in dl-mFirst, ~ 8 6Oft the total sumof money
nothang terms:The Case of the m&!ss
a d e d in these trials is concentratied in
Customer vs. The Case of the Callous
asdnumberofverylnrge~
Corpmtion, The verdict was much larger
Second, the pattern of outin
than my propod s~ttkrnent,brtt
personal injury trids is very Merent
judging from public response it could just
from that in commerial trials. Plainti&
lose most pemnal injury trials -that is, as easily have been zem.
Theuialsweseearetheproductsofa
they do less wd. at trial than they would
-while defendaats are procedural system that is devouring itself.
have by set*
more likely to lose in c o d trials.
As we have refined and elaborated the
On average, pe~onalinjmry vedicts are
rules for jury trials we have multiplied
roughly midway between what @e
the c+ of uial both to the pdes and to
plain& demand and what the
the COW. The costs to the paIties drive
defendants offer in settlement; on
them to skip all these expensive
average, c o d vedcts are
procedures and settle; the costs to the
considerably larger than the plain@
system drive judgs and rulemake= to
demands as well as the defendantss"
offers. h d new wnys to encourage them to do
so. hreasingly~the cases that litigants
Third, jurym I t s ue r d y
compmmisg. Compromise, of course, is
insist an trying are not only mre bur
the essence of settlemmt, but
peculiar- In a sense, the Liebeck h l was
eompmmisejudgments iue also possible
common even in its peculi&ties. Et is
at trial. In fact, they hardly h a p p
m i s h d i i to hold up Liebeck as a typical
When civil disputes end in trial ihen is
example of.American litigption: car
almost always a clear loser, and usually a
accidents and medical procedures must
clear wimer as well.
generate a th~usandhvsuits for every
Here,we examine the role of trial in
coffee-bum case,and punitive damage
American civil litigation, aria consider
awards in any amount am rare in
possible reforms. The key question is:
pemnal injury trials. But trials are never
Why ate compromise verdicts so
typical. Odmay mses of every son are
compromised and settle, and those that
don't are unusual even if the context is a
garden-variety two-car crash.Trials are -
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dolo.
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w problem is mwum:
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r litigmj n&@ to go to Wid?
The~igthafthewstsdlisksa~
ag,gmgad a m = mcmg mes, though
:&*hw*a,f-ntk
angl lialnlitp inmame. h s t all
pleotiffs in our crises are indid&, and
nemly Wof&*nts
coe in&-
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t h such verdicts am EUT suggests &at
damages is not often the mdn isswe at

is a failure. This view of trials is related to
their m c a m .intwo ways. Eizst, as a
cause: The kccurate) belief that trislls are
expensive and risky is a-p%wrfj,l
incentive ~aset& those case5 that can be

settled -<%Q cornwhenever
compmmise is possible, and to avoid aial
at all ccws when the stakes ate too small
for either side to come out ahead. That
leaves 2 reddue of all-or-notlung,caxs
that h e e d compromise before trial and
are likely to pmduce all-or-nothmg
verdim after trial. Second, as a
consequence: The kct rhat trials usually
are q a i v e w i n n e r - ~ h - daffairs
remforccs the CONh t they are
dangerous and to be shamed. ,
And *hat are these stubborn,
u n c o a p m g cases that end in trial?
Jub m our data, fhey axe primarily
disputes over li&Xty rather than
~ a m q p i hpa~rchatisi32hemtinthe
.
natwaf the hum lkmagm isba
continuou~variable, a d -thegforemore
susceprj,bI:e ta compromise and
settlemmnt. &L addition,8 &mqp were
the maimissue in conmti~nat most trials
we wwkd expect to see more

0rdbusincsses.Suchp-,mW
is a dlid~~to-mopus owa,mdd m 1 y muster the hnds or rhe
nave to conduct ix superior Court aial.
he piaim& mIhd e or dismiss; the
- tiability is at hiue a tciel csa only be
defendants wodd settle or &huk k t a
~vdedihtheprdesagpema
Lh;rrnd@~.ethPt-theaecuel
plaintiif wirh a cmthgmt-fee attorney or
darnages multiplied by some estimate of
a defendant with an insurance company
can afford to go ahead, even to €rid.As a
the lil;tel&OOd that a jury will find the
defendant hble. &-trial baqpining will
result, p h & attorneys and Uility
reflect this logic. The plaintiff will not ask insurers play a major role in determining
for more than the known damages,
who has access to court. In most cases, a
plaintiff who cant get a contmgency fee
although in an,wreme case she may
d e d no less, while the defendant will
lawyer pmbably won't he able to sue; one
offer some fraction of the d loss, or
reason plaint&' attorneys may decline to
nothing at all. I£ the case does go to tnal
take a case on: a contingency i s ' h t the
the jury is likely to side with the
defendant is uninsured -which means
defendant md to give the plaintdl
that, except for large institutions,
no-,
or to side with the pktiff and
dudefendants are unlikely to be
give her as much as or mom than she
sued, and if they are sued, they are
demanded in settlement. And indeed, one unlikely to be able to defend &.~MS&RS
or the other of these outcames ~~d
through trial.
in about 77% of our cases. In oPher
But conmgem fees and insumce only
words, uials over liability will produce
make ui$spossible. They do not explain
the all-or-nathg battles that we mostly
why civil trials actually occur, or tell us
see -cases inwhich one side always
what functions tnals serve (if any) in a
loses, and the other side h o s t always
system in which 98% of disputes are
wins.
resolved by setdement. The possible
expexphatiions
fall into three catep*
guidance for settlement, strategic
barsning and strategic i n t m q p e ,
and non-economic interests.
1. C u k efor Satleimen& Every
theory of pre-uial bargaining assumes
that a negotiated settlement is
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thing battles we mostly see
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determined, at l&t in part, by the
parties' predctions of the outcome of the
case if it did go to trial. Needless to say
such predictions are uncertain, and that
uncertainty may affect the terms of a
settlement. For example, a risk-averse
plaintiff may accept less than the
expected value of her claim because she
is unwilling to take the chance of an
unlikely but possible defense verdict. But
there must be some common basis,
however shaky, for assessing the
consequences of a failure to settle. If trials
became vanishingly rare lawyers and
litigants would make increasingly crude
predictions of trial verdicts. As a result
there would be more cases in whch their
ill-informed guesses would be too far
apart to compromise; which would lead
to more trials, more verdicts, and better
information on trial outcomes; which in
turn would produce more settlements,
and reduce or stabilize the trial rate. For
all we know, the few trials that now occur
are pretty close to the minimum number
our settlementdominated system
requires.

2. Strategk Bargaining and Stmtegic
Intransigence. In litigation, as in other
adversarial contexts, many of the moves
in negotiation are "strategicn-ploys that
are used to mislead and manipulate.
Thus litigants will conceal or distort
information to impress their opponents,
demand things that they don't want to get
other concessions that they do, and play
chcken with the opposition in order to
get paid to avoid trials that nobody
wants. When strategic bargaining works
it improves the terms of settlement you may get an additional $20,000 out of
a defendant by convincing him that
otherwise you'll go to trial even if it costs
you $100,000 -but if he calls your bluff
the result may be no settlement at all.
Our data show clear signs of this sort ,
of strategic bargaining. For example, most
defendants in our commercial trials made
puny settlement offers and then got
hammered in court. In 1985-86 the offers
in commercial trials averaged $574,000
less than the verdicts and the defendants
lost 67% of the trials; in 1990-91 they
averaged $1,710,000 less and the
defendants lost 55%
- of the time.

I M I I I ~ ~r~IW
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3n.
m a b&*d t2iiwE5, d
-,
hat '
must be me,but -mendlwe:&ink .not.
For the mom paa the plaint@@ these ,ciiSrs~la*a1qaiththp~a&'
'madepuny deqamb -an amrage 9322,000 Lss thw rhe vdihts & 1m586 and $710,0061m in 1~90-91-h'
c o n w t . t o pmom1 iaguqgbtiff~~
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who demanded on m p l e - a mat &&l
more tbnn rhe jurles
them. Ifr$a,
ccxnmercial plain& wha ultipmteJ,ywait
,to Fol were willing t~ settle fa tho^^,
hwe wko did salg m y h e i q p x & ~
rake an w e n & h ~ ~ i w d h j q
d w of .theirclaims. Whyl The,ga'
majo* af k e e m M J plaiatif&412.
individuals,
-4
p m d' i m j l ~ y
phZlih3 most od ~ I m ~ ~ Z
so* $ s
ar
all oftha costs ofmk w e a tlrird pay
their llwyns at lcaa pa* by rhehow,
and two t.hird~
advance at 1-t a podan
of bmid 'eqxnes.V&iyk l y mmx df
thee plabtifkts w m rel~iernt-orurn&
to invest money 'in li-ri@,w,
eveh'in. \.

ases in which one
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winningcases -and b e defendants can

The mmt common repeat pkyen in
c i d Iiugartiion for rnoneGry d A & p am
take admtage of their timidity by
sticlung to lav-ball offers 'fhat strategy,
not parties themselves but agents of the
parties -plaintiff&azt-tomeysand
howewr, r e q u k the defendant to
ir-mmn. wItpmkS. Thismtes ehe
maintain a posture of intransigence: Take
possibility of cmilicts of intenst. On the
$20,0@0or go to trial. This may be the
best appach, and it may w6rk 95% of
plaintifR side,the attorney m y want to
go to nialto esublish h e d
winner,
the time, but when it fails the result
probably won't be a settlement for
or at least as someone who will fight to
$ ~OO$OObut an expensive trial followed
the expensive end. Such a mputatian
by an even larger verdict.
rmght bring in business, it lmght even
When a party to a b p u t e is a repeat
help future clients, but it has no value to
player -a person or an institution that
the current-me-sht =plaint-&.On ihe
participates in a steady stream of litigated
defense side, the mosr c o n m o p
~ omtid
cases - it has an iadditioml incentive to
c o d k t ocars in .cases with doubtfd.: - behave smtegimlly: to innuence *he
liability and.damages m excess of the .:is
outcomes of other cases. For example, a
liability lmit ~f the dekndantS h m ' 1 ~ e e
newspaper may refuse to ever settle a w
policy If the plaintiff makes a demand at
defamation Claim, regardless of the merits or near ithe policy limit, the d e b t
or the cost, in order to discourage libel
will probably want to take the settlement,
suits by building a reputation as a
whirzh is h e to him,mther than rblc a
stubborn and expensive opponent. On
trial after which he might he stuck with
the other hand, a manufacturermay
personal liability for damages above that
quietly settle a products liability case in
limit. Most liability insurance contracts,
order to avoid a public .trial that could
produce o dangerous precedent if the
manuhctwrer loses, and mkht ~
m
~
k
A

however, pve the insurance company the
power to accept or reject settlemnts, and
the insurance company may pder a trial:
It cant lose more than the policy limit
one way or the other, and,for the price of
trying the case,it might save itself a
setdement of about that arnouqt..
W e h n t doubt that plaintiffs'
attorneys and defendants' insurers
sometimes act in conflict with the best
interests of the parties. But we dont
believe that such conficts (strategic or
ozhembe) are a common came of trials.
Taking a casc to nialaga'inst the interests
of the client violates professional nams,
and m y subject the attomy or the
insurance company to formal or inform$sanctions. No- and sanctions don't n
e b t e abuses, but they do suggest that
the disfavored behavior is the exceptim
rather than the rule. In this context, our
survey data are consistent with that
expectation. The attorneys we interviewed
frequently said thnt the trial was c a u d
by the opposition5 stupidity or &%*p.
stubbornness, but no d e f s e attorney
said that there was no settlement be&use
the plnintiFs attomey wanted a shot at a

Almost nobody said "We gambled and lostwor "We decided to fight, and we woi
major verdia, and no phimiffs lawyer
said that it happened because the
insumce company hid W e to lisk at
trial and was wtnconcemecl about its
insured.
If we ignore occasiody serious
mi
codicts and assme thnt attorneys and
insurance companies W e these cases
in the best intellests of the parties, then
thc =peat p h y e ~in ordinary civil
litigation are all on the defense. Plain*
are almost always individuals and
therefore necessarily one-shot players,
while defendan@,if hey are not large
businesses or government entities -and therefm likely to be repeat players in
their own right -are almost always
insured, usually completely In orher
contexts, repeat players may just as easily
be plaintiffs. This is true of some private
litigants (e .g., environmental p u p s ) and
it is the rule for public litigants: the
Internal Revenue Service, regulatory
agencies, and, most important, criminal
prosecutors. If a repeat party is a plaintiff
it can set its agenda and influence law
and practice by itsfiling stratcply. Indeed,
that is likely to be its main tool, since
nothing that happens lam is as influential
as the decision to file in the fmt place especially since most repeat player
plaintiffs see many more possible caw
then they can ever handle.
A repeat player defendant can hope to
exercise some conml over the general
pattern of litigation, but only through its
satlmmt strategy Unlike a repeat player
plaintiff, it it no other way to send
signals or channel cases. The only
ultimate threat it can make is .the threat of
tnal, and it must take some cases to trial
to keep that threat credhle. Therefore we
would expect the defendants in these
ordinary civil cases to be more likely than
the plainti& to engage in strategic
bargaining, and more prone to take cases
to trial for strategc reasons. Our S I X ~ V ~
data support this prediction. Although

while insured civil defendants (who sethe
and pay up on most cl8nr) win
approximately 70% of personal injury
trials.
Our settlement dau show clear signs
of strategic bargaining by defendants that
is aimed at goals beyond the outemes df
the trials at hand.Many of these caseswent to trial without any meanin&d pretrial negotiations because the ckfednts
made no settlement offers whatever.
These zero-o&r cases make up wer a
quarter of all trids, and about 60% of
medical malpractice trials. A zero offer is
never a reasonable assessment a f the
expected cost of a mse to a de$mdanit.
The trial itself is never f
m and u s w b
expensive, and there is always a chance;
however low, that a jury will side with
the plaintiff. Rut unlike the low-ball
strategy that defendants seem to use in
commercial casts, m a h zero offers is
not a promising way to avoid trials. If no

may also occur becaw the parties have
m m - e e ~ ~ ~ Y E Z %oS & I m
judgments Sewrid
have
~ d t h e i m p 0 ~ 0 f ~
partimla~m~-moTnSc
motive: the
desire to have a day im CQUT~,to o h i h
f
~ jtl~tb?.
d They A h k t
1itqpmt.s wmt a type of sgltisktim that
settlement ram137
-public
vindacatiion-dthepagiiithnt
.
vindbtion is a goal that our legat +em
should promme.
Qur interviews wih attorneys in t
k
1990-91uials provide some h t s on rhe
m e of nmeconomk ataks in civil -Is.
Forthe most pan, our h d q p are ,negative. In ?35'~erviewP,
only.three
attorneys mentioned n desin far
rdndiation a~ an ed~p-on
far why
their casr went to vinL Two ~ t lsaid~
their cr;tcie was +triedbecause a party
b & d her day in colln;,theywe= on
the opposing sides af the snme case,&id
each pointed his hgea at the otherb.
client. Only a 6w* attributed triJs even in
part ta the &re of a dip-ntfor a hesling
or P public judgment. Nor did any aher
nonecorn& mati= m&ee as a
common explanation for tlmc uiels.
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Most physician malpractice imurmce
policies sold in Womb comain a
The "consent to settle" clause which requires
'
the atgreement of the doctor to any nonzm,settlement negotiated by the insurer.
Lack of consent is mentioned by an
, " clients' (and their own) economic
$&em& in the litigation. Some attorneys
attomqr as a cause of trial in 19 of the 32
1990-91 zero-offer medical malpractice
,&nay have becone sd acculturated to the
trials, and we suspect that it was a factor
in at least several other mehcal
malpractice trials in whch no attorney
they
specifically mentioned it. We also h o w
that the trial rate in medical malpractice
cases is considerably higher across the
nation than for any other category of
driving their eases to trial.
;.personal injury litigation, and that
. . doctors win defense verdicts in more than
ommon litigation in Caifomia ., ' 90% of the cases in whch there is no
don't care much about having their; .settlement offer at any point in the
m court. Despite what some rhokrs : litigation. What explains these patterns?
What seems to be happening is that
doctors are insisting on tnal in some
,G an
medical malpractice cases in whch they
advantage. FMllf it may be- .- expect to obtain public vindication. T ~ E
plaintiffs and defehbts ; -L,-,+ is most hkely to happen when the doctor
prefer vth&cation at uial to private$.- 'is convinced that she acted in a
prof&ssionallyresponsible manner, but
has nonetheless been wounded in her self
esteem and damaged in her reputation by
and the plaintiff k attorney , -. - a patienth claim that she committed
ntrol the settlement de&i~n. ,;->:. malpractice. Cases where the defendant
mdt, few ofthe case$ that Ldc go:;feels like that all the way up to trial are
-F;ilikely to be winners for the defense. In
other contacts, insurance companies
settle most odds-on winners for
for vindication was indeed at Ithe ,,comparatively small amounts, in order to
f many trials -- ar least in one type .-i,
save trial costs and to minimize risks.
. As we've seen. 27% of these me~-,Not here. Unlike other litigants, doctors
not settle because defendan&offered --I; have negotiated insurance contracts that
hing to the phix~frif,at any pint in .I: give them the power to make that choice
preoial proceeding. This "zmoffef - .$ themselves. Moreover, since the insurance
ried across types of daims. from a ; i-'
cornpimy remains responsible for the
1 1 % m 1 5 % i a v e ~ c .~
g e m trials,to a hign of 59% to
maIprwrice trials.We believe-. ::
te of zm-offers in medical .
:'
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defense costs and for damage awards at
trial, the defendant doctor can usually
reject a low settlement without
undertaking personal hbility for legal
costs or for any judgment w i h policy
limits. The usual result is a trial that the
insurance company pays for, and the
doctor wins.In other words, at least in
one type of litigation where reputation
and vindication are particularly
sigruficant for a coherent constituency of
defendants, those defendants have been
able to order their private relationshps
with their insurance companies in a way
that protects that interest.
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A s we noted at the outset, a major and successful -goal of lawyers, judges
and rule makers is to promote
settlements. We do not advocate an
attempt to further reduce the extremely
low trial rate in our civil courts, but if a
further reduction is sought, our research
suggests that some methods are more
likely to succeed than others.
The techniques of encouragmg
settlement can be roughly divided
between two approaches. The first set of
techniques rely on infomation. They
attempt to aclueve settlement by
providing unbiased information to t
parties about the dispute. The second
of techniques rely on incentives. They
encourage parties to settle by increasin
the risks or reducing the rewards of

tored. If you fail to settle:
A
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must drop out entirely or pay a lot to gamble at high stakes.
on the as is of the best information they
have been able to obtain. By changing the
structure of costs and rewards it is
possible to change the odds of favorable
outcomes for one side or the other, or for
both, across whole categories of cases.
The result might be an overall change in
the pattern of civil litigation, including,
perhaps, a reduction in the number
of trials.
Or perhaps not. For example, consider
the effects of eliminating contingent fees
altogether - an extreme proposal, and,
in our opinion, an extremely bad idea. If
that happened the number of civil law
suits would be reduced drastically, at least
in the short run; and the distribution of
cases that were filed would change
dramatically (e.g., a higher proportion of
the remaining filings would be in
commercial cases); new institutions
would be created to cope with the new
needs generated by the system (e.g., new
systems for paylng legal fees, including
perhaps new forms of insurance); the
pattern of settlements and trial outcomes
would change in unforeseeable ways; and
the number of trials might go down. But it
also might not. It could turn out that we
would still need as many trials as we now
have, or more to define the contours of
the new system.
Procedures that affect the risks of trial
also have the opposite effect. The
of large jury verdicts on the one
, and of defense verdicts on the
, weigh heavily in favor of
ement. Ancient procedural devices
as remittitur and additur, and newer
such as damage caps and limitations
a punitive damages, should (if anything)

increase the percentage of filed cases that
possible outcomes at trial could help
proceed to trial. In addition, or instead,
answer that demand by making trial less
the parties to a lawsuit may agree
scary, whch might encourage more
privately to restrict the risk of extreme
parties to take their chances and try it.
gw>:~ r s
outcomes at trial. A strilung example is a , , pik,,;:,~&,::'
technique known as the "hgh-low
.*t:Jk?~7
..>
agreement."
- * , -+-conclusion
~$4
A "high-low agreement" is a partial
2
settlement in which the plaintiff and the
The essence of adversarial litigation is
defendant each insure the other against
procedure. We define justice in
an extreme verdict. The plaintiff agrees to procedural terms: the judgment of a
collect no more than a maximum amount competent court following a trial that was
specified in the agreement, regardless of a procedurally correct. When we want to
hgher jury verdict, while the defendant
improve our judcial system we pass a
agrees to pay no less than a minimum
procedural reform, which invariably
amount specified in the agreement,
means elabomting ofd procedural rules or
regardless of a lower jury verdict. Highadding new ones -rules that govern the
low agreements have been reported since
presentation of evidence and arguments,
at least 1968. They are usually reached
rules that create opportunities to
shortly before or during trial, padcularly
investigate and to prepare evidence and
in penonal injury cases involving large
argument, and rules that are designed to
potential damages and uncertain liability; regulate the use of the procedures that are
they are legal and enforceable.
available to investigate, prepare and
High-low agreements permit private
present evidence and argument. The
parties to limit the scope of a juryb factupshot is a -terpiece
of detail, with
finding on damages in ways that go
rules on everydung from specid
beyond those permitted by the rules of
appearances to contest the jurisdiction of
evidence and summary judgment. Under
the court to the use of &bits during
this procedure, trial outcomes are
jury deliberation. But we can't afford it.
~
~ by the settkment
~
negotiations
~
e As litigants,
d
few of us can pay the costs of
that preceded them: the agreement to
trial; as a society, we are unwilling to pay
participate in this constrained trial is the
even a fraction of the cost of the judicial
last step of an incomplete compromise.
apparatus that we would need to try most
The availability of this option (if the
civll cases. We have designed a
parties are aware of it) will tend to
spectacular system for adjudicating
discourage full settlements and to
disputes, but itS too expensive to use.
facilitate trials. It's no secret that our
We respond to this dilemma on two
system of civil justice has generated a
levels, private and public. The private
pent-up demand for low cost litigation. As mpome is to create instimtiom that
a result, a procedure that lowers the cost
enable parties to aggregate the costs,
of litigation -for example, a small-claims and benefits of litigation across many
court -will increase the volume of
cases: liability insurance for defendants,
litigation and the number of trials (albeit
to pay for legal fees as well as damages,
cheaper, quicker trials). The development and contingency fees for plaintiffs. These
of the high-low agreement demonstrates
structures make it p=ible for
to
the existence of a parallel demand for low
prepare for t ~ land
, to retain trial as an
risk adjudication. Any techruque, public
or private, that reduces the range of
.
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main function of trials is not to resolve disputes but to deter other trials.
option. The public response is to actively
discourage trials. We provide some
positive assistance in reaching
compromises, but the main push is
negative: Litigants learn to avoid trial in
order to reduce their risks and save their
money Formal litigation is presented not
as an adjunct but as an alternative to
private settlement; not as an aid but as
a threat.
The main function of trials is not to
resolve disputes but to deter other trials.
And they do, very effectively One
consequence is that those few cases that
do go to jury trial - perhaps 2% of civil
filings, and less than 1% of all civil
claims - are very different from the mass
of cases that settle. They are typically
high-risk, all or n o t h g cases, cases with
unusual facts or intransigent parties, cases
that defy compromise. Their outcomes,
by comparison with ordinary work-a-day
settlement cases, are costly, unpredictable,
and sometimes bizarre. Since jury trials
and jury verdicts are the most visible
products of litigation, these extreme and
unrepresentative cases distort public
perception of the administration of civil
justice. In the process, they perpetuate
the image of litigation as terror, which
helps drive all but the most hopeless
disputes out of court, whch means that
any general policy based on what
happens in those cases that are tried d l
be misconceived.
In 1921 Learned Hand wrote that "as a
litigant I should dread a law suit beyond
almost anything else short of sickness and
death" - a widely repeated and
deceptively simple sentence.Judge Hand's
statement was not intended as a report of
an idiosyncratic aversion, but as a
judgment by one who ought to know
that litigation is dreadful. Lesser judges
and mere lawyers mostly agree, including
us. Our research adds evidence to
support one part of this widely shared

belief: those lawsuits that are fought to
the end are indeed risky, costly, and
unpredictable.
Hand's main message, of course, is not
a description, but an injunction: Don't
litigate. It is a concise expression of the
repeated advice of generations of
conscientious lawyers: Anticipate
problems and avoid conflicts; if conflicts
arise, resolve them privately; if at all
possible, don't sue. And when lawsuits
are filed, t h s advice is transformed into
the mantra of the judge: Settle. Every day
in countless settlement conferences trial
judges sell their own versions of Learned
Hand's wisdom: "They're offering you
$70,000. A jury could give you
$150,000, but I've seen folks just like you
come up empty, lots of times. If it were
me, I'd be scared; I'd take it." More often
yet, this lecture is delivered by lawyers
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long before any judge enters the picture.
There is another injunction that could
be embedded in Judge Handk aphorism:
Our system of justice is terrible, and we
must change it. But we don't understand
him that way anymore than we interpret
him to mean that a dispute is an injury
and a lawsuit the process by which it is
healed. We not only accept as a fact that
it is the lawsuit that is the disease, we
seem to relish it. If trial were a safe, soft,
reassuring process, many more disputants
would seek trial and the courts would be
overwhelmed; they're struggling as it is at
a 2% trial rate. But there's no cause for
concern. The major elements of the
system -adversarial factfinding, trial by
jury, contingent fees, liability insurance
- all fit together to make trial the
dangerous event we need to drive nearly everyone to settle.
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